

*Share this copy!*

VOL.II NO.10

JUNE 1944

# INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



FOR USE OF MILITARY  
PERSONNEL ONLY. NOT  
TO BE PUBLISHED

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

# Intelligence Bulletin

VOL. II, NO. 10  
MID 461

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department

Washington 25, D. C.  
June 1944

## NOTICE

The *Intelligence Bulletin* is designed primarily for the use of junior officers and enlisted men. It is a vehicle for disseminating to them the latest information received from Military Intelligence sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin, its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the exclusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the publication in which the material is reproduced is sent to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

\*

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discussions with troops.

\*

Each year the August issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin* contains an index to articles which have appeared during the past 12 months.

\*

Readers are invited to comment on the use that they are making of the *Intelligence Bulletin* and to forward suggestions for future issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through channels for approval.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### PART ONE: GERMANY

SECTION		Page
	I. U. S. SOLDIERS DESCRIBE ENEMY METHODS IN ITALY	1
	II. GROUND TACTICS OF GERMAN PARATROOPS.....	6
	III. HOW PARATROOPS CLEAR FIELDS FOR GLIDERS.....	10
	1. Introduction .....	10
	2. Reconnaissance for Suitable Fields.....	10
	3. Construction of Landing Fields.....	12
	IV. NEW GERMAN RIFLE FOR PARATROOPERS .....	13
	V. RATIONS AS A FACTOR IN PARATROOP EFFICIENCY.....	16
	VI. A GERMAN'S REACTION TO A BRITISH NIGHT ATTACK	19
	VII. GERMAN TANK PLATOONS OPERATING AS POINTS.....	24
	1. Composition .....	24
	2. Communication .....	25
	a. <i>Within the Point Platoon</i> .....	25
	b. <i>Within the Armored Regiment</i> .....	25
	3. On the March.....	27
	a. <i>Combat Vehicles</i> .....	27
	b. <i>Supply Column</i> .....	27
	VIII. NEW GERMAN EMPHASIS ON SALVAGING MATERIEL	29
	IX. SOME NOTES ON GERMAN INTELLIGENCE METHODS.....	33
	1. Interrogation of Prisoners .....	33
	2. Signal Security and Interception.....	35
	X. GERMAN MULTIPURPOSE CARBIDE LANTERN.....	37
	1. Introduction .....	37
	2. Variety of Uses .....	39
	3. Method of Operation with Carbide.....	39
	4. Defective Burning .....	40
	5. Accessories .....	41

### PART TWO: JAPAN

SECTION		Page
	I. JAPANESE TANK TACTICS .....	42
	1. General .....	42
	2. Using Three Tank Battalions.....	44
	3. Use of Tanks on Tarawa.....	46

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<b>II. JAPANESE ANTEAIRCRAFT AND COASTAL DEFENSES.....</b>	<b>49</b>
1. General .....	49
a. <i>As to Location</i> .....	49
b. <i>As to Construction</i> .....	50
c. <i>As to Patterns</i> .....	51
d. <i>As to Camouflage</i> .....	52
2. Examples of Positions.....	53
a. <i>Six-gun Heavy Battery (Attu)</i> .....	54
b. <i>Combination of Batteries (Burma)</i> .....	54
c. <i>Combination of Batteries (Kolombangara)</i> .....	55
d. <i>Light Battery on Mounds</i> .....	59
e. <i>Heavy AA-Coastal Defense Battery</i> .....	59
f. <i>Three-gun AA-Coastal Defense Battery</i> .....	60
<b>III. TWO AA/AT POSITIONS .....</b>	<b>61</b>
1. General .....	61
2. Machine-cannon Battery Position.....	61
3. Antiaircraft Battery Position .....	64
<b>IV. HOW A COMBAT PATROL CAPTURED TWO JAPANESE.....</b>	<b>65</b>
1. Introduction .....	65
2. The Narrative .....	66
<b>V. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES.....</b>	<b>71</b>
1. General .....	71
2. Enemy Views on Handling Prisoners.....	72
3. Burying Arms and Equipment.....	73
4. Standards for Censoring Mail.....	73
<b>VI. IMPROVISED LAND MINE USED BY JAPANESE.....</b>	<b>75</b>
1. Introduction .....	75
2. Description .....	75
<b>VII. JAPANESE HINTS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER.....</b>	<b>77</b>
1. Introduction .....	77
2. The Treatise .....	77
<b>VIII. MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS.....</b>	<b>80</b>
1. Introduction .....	80
2. A Lieutenant Speaks Out.....	80
3. Death and the Japanese Soldier.....	81
4. Miscellaneous Briefs .....	82

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

V

<b>PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS</b>		<b>Page</b>
<b>SECTION</b>	<b>I. SOUVENIR HUNTING IS STILL A PROBLEM.....</b>	<b>84</b>
	<b>II. SECURITY NOTES .....</b>	<b>87</b>
	1. Rumors .....	87
	2. Sense and Censorship.....	88

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>1. German Improvised Landing Field for Gliders.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>2. New German Paratrooper's Rifle.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>3. German Multipurpose Carbide Lantern.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>4. Japanese Employment of Three Tank Battalions....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>5. Dead Space around Japanese Model 2595 Light Tank</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>6. Japanese Tank Revetment (Tarawa) .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>FIGURES</b>	<b>7-12. Japanese Antiaircraft Positions.....</b>	<b>55-60</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>13. Japanese Machine-cannon Battery Position.....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>14. Japanese Antiaircraft Battery Position.....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>15. Diagram of Ambush by U. S. Patrol.....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>FIGURE</b>	<b>16. Japanese Improvised Land Mine.....</b>	<b>76</b>

## PART ONE: GERMANY

### **Section I. U. S. SOLDIERS DESCRIBE ENEMY METHODS IN ITALY**

---

In a series of informal discussions, a number of U. S. junior officers and enlisted men who have been fighting the Germans at Cassino and the Anzio beachhead have made the following useful comments on enemy combat methods. This section should be regarded as supplementary to *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 9, pages 61-65, in which some recent German tactics were discussed by U. S. Army unit commanders and observers.

On the Anzio beachhead the enemy is making considerable use of his light machine gun and machine pistol. The latter is not too accurate, but has a very high rate of fire. The artillery that the enemy is employing is mostly 105-mm., 88-mm., and long-range 170-mm. The light and medium artillery consists chiefly of self-propelled guns, which are moved frequently to create an impression that the Germans are using more guns than is actually the case. A self-propelled gun will sometimes have as many as five or six firing positions. The enemy has also been using the six-barreled rocket projector.<sup>1</sup>

Many offensive moves have been made by patrols varying in size from five to two hundred men. The objectives have been

---

<sup>1</sup> This is the *Nebelwerfer 41*, which was described in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 9-15.

limited—usually a commanding hill. The Germans often made only a single thrust—retiring if this was unsuccessful.

Once the Germans have established a defensive line, they usually hold it lightly with automatic weapons. The enemy maintains a strong mobile reserve capable of counterattacking at any point which is pierced or threatened. In other words, the Germans try to catch the attacker in a disorganized state and throw him off balance. The enemy is likely to counter-attack a position he has just lost, even if he employs only a squad or a handful of men for the job. This has been done on numerous occasions, particularly in the Venafro area. However, counterattacks are usually made in greater strength.

Although the Germans often lay down heavy artillery and mortar fire before an attack, they sometimes make lavish use of such fire without following it with an attack. In one sector the Germans laid down a concentration of ten rounds per minute for 60 minutes, and even then no attack followed.

The Germans have used motorcycles at night to drown out the sounds of moving tanks and other vehicles.

---

The fighting I was engaged in took place in mountains and hills. It was possible for the enemy to use a minimum of men to defend a maximum of ground. Usually, German organization of the ground was excellent. Commanding terrain features were given the utmost attention. Gun positions were well built and had good fields of fire. As a rule, when a key position was overrun and taken, the Germans evacuated the supporting positions and retired to prepared positions in the rear.

German mortar fire usually followed a specific procedure: the enemy would try to pin us down with small-arms and machine-gun fire and then deluge us with mortar fire.

Enemy soldiers who were left in positions to provide covering fire generally fought until their ammunition was exhausted. Then they surrendered.

The machine pistol was used constantly as a harassing weapon.

---

On the Cassino front, the Germans used dugouts made of reinforced concrete and steel. The walls were about 5 feet thick. One of these dugouts withstood direct 75-mm fire at 10 yards. In general, they had excellent fields of fire, with trees and other obstacles cleared in front of firing slits.

German deployment in the attack often is poor.

In the defense the enemy uses very good judgment in selecting his fields of fire. At night he will fire at sound. The mortar and the M.G. 42 are his main weapons; he uses the machine pistol for sniping and in protecting the M.G. 42. He stays well concealed, and is very hard to move when he has the advantage of high ground.

If you drive him from his guns during a barrage and get into his positions, he will come back with his hands up until he reaches his guns. He will then drop down and open fire, also making use of hand grenades.

---

Enemy firing positions are mutually supporting. The trenches are usually well dug-in and are about 4 feet deep. The dirt is sometimes scattered, but I've noticed that the dirt is generally used to form an embankment beside the trench. When time permits, the pits for two or more men are usually covered with heavy logs for protection. The logs are then covered with some dirt, and are camouflaged with brush or hay to blend with the countryside.

Jerry makes good use of his mobile artillery. In the evening Jerry would bring in his guns and fire on some previously observed or reconnoitered hill where our troops were. Then, before daylight, he would pull out.

---

At night, time fire from German artillery was directed on

our installations by flares dropped from planes. By a similar method, areas have been illuminated for observation.

One batch of prisoners that we captured was armed with machine pistols, which had been used extensively to make a small patrol sound like a company.

The Germans often construct reinforced concrete pillboxes inside houses. This method gives the enemy first-rate camouflage.

German artillery adjustments sometimes were made with one piece (not always, of course) and, when the adjustments were completed, a high burst or a smoke round was fired to bring the impacts on the target. When our artillery was firing close-in support on enemy front-line installations, the Germans often fired immediately after we did, to make it appear that we were firing short and on our own troops.

---

Many of the enemy's installations are prepared beforehand with heavy engineer equipment, particularly in rocky positions. His weapons often are in shallow emplacements, with deep, well-covered personnel dugouts nearby. These dugouts are often reinforced with steel plating, concrete, timbers, railroad ties, and several feet of dirt.

The enemy's weapon training has obviously been thorough. His M.G. 42 is a very rapid-firing gun, but it is likely to be laid on a final protective line and fired only on that. It is seldom fired in well-placed or aimed bursts.

The enemy makes extensive use of his mortars. As long as he has observation, and is not actually getting fire on his gun position, he will fire on any likely target.

---

At first, the enemy's defense may seem to be very loose and poorly organized, but, as it develops, it usually turns out to be exactly the opposite. He has had every opportunity to prepare his positions beforehand, and they are very well built and concealed. Often the places that don't appear to be under

fire are thickly laid minefields, which are not fired on until we have nearly cleared or crossed them. They are then subjected to concentrated mortar fire.

The enemy uses all kinds of ruses. He will often fire continually in one sector, to draw attention from a nearby sector which he wishes to reinforce or evacuate.

## **Section II. GROUND TACTICS OF GERMAN PARATROOPS**

---

The commander of a German parachute demonstration battalion recently issued to his companies a directive which affords useful insight into some of the ground tactics that enemy paratroopers may be expected to employ. The following extracts from the battalion commander's order are considered especially significant:

1. For parachute and air-landing operations, I have given orders for section leaders and their seconds-in-command to carry rifles, and for the No. 3 men on the light machine guns to carry machine carbines. There are tactical reasons for this decision. The section commander must be able to point out targets to his section by means of single tracer rounds. The No. 3 man on the light machine gun must be able to give this gun covering fire from his machine carbine in the event that close combat takes place immediately after landing. This last should be regarded as a distinct possibility. He must provide this covering fire until the light machine gun is in position and ready to fire. Before the assault, the No. 3 man on the light machine gun must also be able to beat off local counterattacks with his machine carbine until the machine gun is ready to go into action.

2. Since so many targets are likely to be seen only for a fleeting moment, and since the rifleman himself must disappear from hostile observation as soon as he has revealed his position by firing, the German paratrooper must be extremely

skillful at "snap shooting" (rapid aiming and firing). The following three points are to be noted and put into practice:

a. Snap shooting is most useful at short ranges. It will not be employed at ranges of more than 330 yards, except in close combat and defense, when it will generally be employed at ranges under 1,100 yards.

b. Even more important than rapid aiming and firing is rapid disappearance after firing, no matter what the range may be.

c. Movement is revealing, also. Men must move as little as possible and must quickly find cover from fire at each bound.

3. I leave to company commanders the distribution of automatic and sniper rifles within companies. I wish only to stress the following principles:

a. Wherever possible, sniper and automatic rifles will be given to those paratroopers who can use them most effectively. In general practice, this rules out commanders and headquarters personnel (who have duties other than firing).

b. There seems to be a general but incorrect impression that our sniper rifles improve the marksmanship of men who are only moderately good shots. These rifles are provided with telescopes only to make more distinct those targets which are not clearly visible to the naked eye. This means that an advantage accrues solely to very good marksmen firing at medium ranges—and, what is more, only where impact can be observed and the necessary adjustments made. Since the sniper is seldom in a position where he can observe for himself, a second man, with binoculars, generally will be detailed to work with the sniper.

4. I wish company commanders to make the report on the Battle of Crete the subject of continual reference in their own lectures, and in the lectures of platoon commanders who are training noncoms. I particularly desire that those passages in the report which deal with the importance of the undertaking

as a whole be drilled into every man. The last three exercises I have attended have shown me that this principle is by no means evident to all platoon commanders. Platoon commanders in this battalion are still too much inclined to fight their own private brands of war instead of paying attention to the larger picture.

5. It is extremely likely that, during a parachute or air-landing operation, this battalion will land in hostile positions not previously reconnoitered, and will have to fight for the landing area. Such fighting will be carried out according to the same regulations which would obtain if we had fought our way into the heart of a hostile position.

6. Inasmuch as we shall soon be receiving our new machine guns,<sup>1</sup> training with those new machine guns we already have must be pushed forward in our light companies—at least to the extent of giving the No. 1 men about 1½ hours a day on it. The most important point to be driven home is that this weapon is to be fired in very short bursts to avoid waste of ammunition.<sup>2</sup>

7. During the exercises and field firing demonstrations I have witnessed—I admit they have been few—I did not once see yellow identification panels used to mark our forward line, nor did I see the swastika flags used to identify our own troops to friendly aircraft. Henceforth, these panels and flags will be carried on all occasions and will be spread out at the proper times.

8. I wish platoon exercises to include more emphasis on the attacks on well prepared defensive positions. This will include cooperation between two assault detachments and a reserve assault ("mopping-up") detachment.

Each German paratroop company commander, it is

---

<sup>1</sup> Here the German battalion commander is probably referring to a conversion of regular or modified M.G. 42's.

<sup>2</sup> No doubt the enemy also hopes that this precaution will help to keep the fire on the target.

reported, must designate five to seven of his best men as a tank-hunting detachment. These men perform their regular duties, but are prepared to act as a team in their tank-hunting capacity whenever they may be called upon. The infantry training of German paratroopers is usually very thorough, covering all normal training and, in some instances, use of the light machine gun, heavy machine gun, mortar, and antitank rifle, as well. Cunning and initiative are stressed. Many men are taught to drive tanks and other vehicles. Use of simple demolitions and the handling of antitank and antipersonnel mines are often included in the training.

## **Section III. HOW PARATROOPS CLEAR FIELDS FOR GLIDERS**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The Germans are well aware that troops dropped by parachute must be supplied rapidly with sufficient reinforcements, equipment, ammunition, and rations if the average paratroop operation is to have a fighting chance of success. To achieve this, the Germans stipulate that the first mission of certain designated paratroopers, on landing in the jump area, is to improvise a landing field for gliders. Reinforcement by air-landing troops is the first use to which an improvised field is put. Supplies which cannot be dropped are landed next. After this, the Germans try to establish an organized supply system, which will include full protection of the supplies arriving and an orderly distribution to the troops.

### **2. RECONNAISSANCE FOR SUITABLE FIELDS**

If German paratroops are forced to engage in combat immediately upon hitting the ground or shortly afterward, the designated soldiers attempt to reconnoiter for suitable landing fields not too far from the area in which fighting is in progress, and yet, wherever possible, out of range of hostile fire. The German

preference is for a field near a road or path leading to the fighting troops. It is regarded as essential that the surrounding obstacles permit a glide of at least "1 in 15."<sup>1</sup> An effort is made to provide each regiment with one glider landing field having at least two landing strips. The object is to allow a number of gliders to land simultaneously. An ideal field, the Germans specify, is one which permits gliders to land regardless of the direction in which the wind is blowing.

The Germans regard the following as unfavorable features: very rocky, uneven ground; stony ground where the stones go deeper than 2 feet and consequently are hard to remove; swampy or wooded ground; ground with thick vegetation, ditches, stone walls, hedges, wire fences, and so on.

The following, on the other hand, are described as favorable features: moderately soft ground with grass; ground with tall grass and even a little vegetation; farm land, even if furrowed; corn fields (which are fairly easy to clear); and sandy ground, even if it is somewhat pebbly.

<sup>1</sup> This means that the length of the landing field must be at least 15 times the height of the trees or other obstacles which fringe the field. See figure 1.




Figure 1.—German Improvised Landing Field for Gliders.

Besides the above, the prevailing wind direction also influences the German choice of a field.

### **3. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDING FIELDS**

All obstacles are removed, not only from the landing strip, but from a zone 65 feet wide on each side of the strip. Uneven ground is leveled. Although normally every precaution is taken to lessen the danger of crash landings, the Germans follow an interesting procedure if time is very short or if the terrain presents great difficulties. Under these circumstances, the Germans clear at least one-third of the landing strip, on the principle that this much of a strip will at least decrease the speed of a glider somewhat after it touches the ground, and that crash landings will consequently be eased to some extent.

Just off the landing strips, parking areas are prepared for the gliders already landed. These parking areas are so arranged as not to hinder further development of the landing strip, in case this is ordered later. Vegetation stripped from the landing field is saved, and is used in camouflaging the parked gliders.

The center of the landing strip is marked with identification panels for air recognition, and the wind direction is shown by a large T made with panels and, indicated when necessary, by smoke as well.

## **Section IV. NEW GERMAN RIFLE FOR PARATROOPERS**

---

The Germans have a new 7.92-mm automatic rifle, the F.G. 42 (*Fallschirmjäger Gewehr 42*), which is a light and versatile weapon, especially suitable for use by German airborne personnel. It should be remembered that the 9-mm machine carbines (M.P. 38/40), which are now in general use, were originally introduced as parachutists' weapons; in like manner, the Germans may well put this new 7.92-mm rifle to more general use in the future.

The new rifle (see fig. 2), which represents a departure in small-arms design, is a close-combat weapon firing any 7.92-mm Mauser rifle ammunition, and combines a relatively light weight<sup>1</sup> with a reasonable degree of accuracy both in single-round and automatic fire. The Germans have struck a balance between the weight limitations of the machine carbine and the power and pressure requirements of the rifle or light machine gun.

The F.G. 42 is air-cooled and gas-operated. In spite of the extensive use of stamping, instead of intricate machine-tool work, and in spite of the fact that all com-

<sup>1</sup> The F.G. 42 weighs 10½ pounds with the bayonet and with a filled 20-round magazine.



Figure 2.—New German Paratrooper's Rifle.

ponent weights have been reduced to a minimum, the new weapon is fairly sturdy.

It is provided with a light folding bipod and a spike bayonet which, when attached, increases the over-all length of the rifle from 3 feet 1 inch to 3 feet 8 $\frac{1}{4}$  inches. The feed is from a 20-round box magazine which fits into the left side of the gun. The magazine may be loaded separately or from standard 5-round Mauser clips from the right side of the gun.

The F.G. 42 may well be used as a "powerful" machine carbine, as a "short range" self-loading rifle, or as a light machine gun when mounted on the bipod.

## **Section V. RATIONS AS A FACTOR IN PARATROOP EFFICIENCY**

---

It is popularly but wrongly supposed that German paratroopers are granted special ration privileges at all times. Membership in German parachute units (as in the case of U. S. Army parachute units) is on a voluntary basis, and in this connection the Germans put out a good deal of propaganda about special rations, to attract volunteers. The truth is that enemy paratroops receive special rations only just before actual parachute operations. When these soldiers are to go into combat as ordinary infantrymen, no additional rations are issued.

However, the specially planned rations that are given to German paratroopers prior to jumping (both in training and in combat) have a significance, the importance of which will not escape the intelligent U. S. fighting man. These rations include items which are not only attractive to the Germans, thereby building morale, but which will actually increase the physical stamina of the paratroop personnel. Incidentally, the special rations, creating a heartier appetite, lead to greater consumption of ordinary food; although the latter may be less attractive, they are energy-giving and naturally help to improve physical fitness.

White bread and dairy products, such as milk and fresh eggs, are considered real luxuries by the German soldiers; these items normally are not issued to troops of the other arms and services as part of the regular diet. On the day that a jump is to be made, German paratroopers are given the following, in addition to their normal ration:

approx. .7 lb. white bread  
approx. .25 lb. crackers  
approx. .06 lb. butter  
approx. 1 pt. fresh milk  
1 fresh egg

A ration of an entirely different kind is issued on days when long flights are to be made. The Germans have studied the nutritional benefits of specialized rations, and have concluded that on long flights regular rations sit too heavily on the stomach. The rations described below are issued only when two flights of two hours duration are to be made, or a single flight lasting four hours or more.

approx. .16 lb. crystallized fruits  
approx. .25 lb. crackers  
approx. .06 lb. sugar  
approx. .04 lb. butter  
1 bar of chocolate substitute

Analysis of this ration indicates that it contains an abundance of energy-giving foods which will sustain the individual without causing gastric discomfort.

The Germans have adopted an iron ration which is intended to last for a three-day period during operations. This emergency ration is similar to those developed by the United States and Great Britain. A ration of this bulk can easily be carried on the person, and provides the necessary "lift" for a man to carry out the most arduous tasks. It consists of:

- 2 cans of sausage
- 2 cans of cheese
- 1 bar of chocolate substitute
- 1 package of crackers
- 6 packages of chewing gum
- 1 package of lemonade powder
- 1 package of coffee mixed with sugar
- 1 tablet of solid fuel for heating

The iron rations are intended to make the German paratrooper self-sufficient for a limited period of time. Inclusion of the fuel tablet allows him to prepare a hot beverage, and yet maintain individual security precautions. This tablet burns for about 5 minutes, yielding a smokeless white flame 2 or 3 inches high.

## **Section VI. A GERMAN'S REACTION TO A BRITISH NIGHT ATTACK**

---

After a recent action near Minturno, Italy, in which a British raiding party attacked a German antitank-gun pillbox, a German prisoner gave a detailed description of the attack, from an enemy point of view.

In the evening of 30 December, the prisoner arrived at the pillbox, which was situated at one end of a bridge across the Garigliano River. He was to serve as the new gun commander. The man already in command, who was to be relieved with his crew the following day, was to give him full instructions as to the mission, the targets, and so on. Thus there were two gun commanders in the pillbox at the same time, as well as three crew members. (The prisoner stated that a new gun commander had also been dispatched to a second antitank gun position, further south, to take over the following day.)

At about 2200, the British laid down an artillery barrage. The prisoner commented that although the concrete pillbox received several hits, which shook the occupants severely, it did not collapse. For this reason, he said, he felt comparatively safe; but he admitted that the barrage frayed his nerves badly. He said that he did not blame the German infantry in exposed posi-

tions along the west bank of the river for having withdrawn to the rear. However, he added, if these German troops had not withdrawn, it would have been impossible for the British to advance from that direction and, in a surprise move, arrive in his sector.

When the barrage lifted, intense firing was going on east of the river. From the noise and the length of combat, he deduced that the British forward platoon was fighting well.

At about 0400 his entire sector was illuminated by flares. In the bright light he could see some men running in and out of the ruins of a Roman amphitheater about 200 yards away. He was unable to tell whether they were friend or foe.

By this time the men in the pillbox had been joined by a corporal of engineers, who had fled from his post at the river, where he had been on ferrying duty with a small detachment.

During the entire night, frantic discussions went on in the pillbox as to what course of action should be taken; however, since everyone was both confused and frightened, the discussions resulted in nothing more than excited talking and gesturing.

From the entrance, the prisoner suddenly noticed a number of men—about 100, he estimated—rising from the grass to the south and advancing quickly toward the ruins of the amphitheater. This advance was conducted quite silently, compared to the sounds which came from the amphitheater a few minutes later. The

prisoner said that what happened next was like a fantastic play, with black figures moving in all directions under flares, with the sound of firing mingled with the music of bagpipes. The prisoner said that during lulls in the firing he could observe British troops moving along the main road—silently, because of their rubber soles. He observed that this was in marked contrast to the sound of German boots he had heard when, before the attack, German soldiers had been moving about in the vicinity of the amphitheater.

A number of British soldiers advanced toward the pillbox, and the occupants went into a huddle to try to figure out a means of escape. The prisoner unblocked one of the two apertures, but could barely push his head through. The old gun commander decided to open fire with a machine pistol. He loaded it, fired a magazine, and then shouted for more ammunition, not realizing that five magazines were lying close beside him. The prisoner mustered courage, and fired two rounds with his own machine pistol, only to find that the feeding had stopped, probably because of a broken magazine spring.

The advancing British fired a machine-gun burst into the pillbox, killing the old gun commander and one of the crew. Going to the antitank-gun aperture, the prisoner saw some British soldiers moving toward the shelter from the undefended side. The prisoner crouched by the aperture, which had been cleared in the hope that escape in that direction would be possible;

however, any such move now was out of the question. A British soldier approached, and fired his machine gun into the pillbox. In the dark he unwittingly rested his gun on the prisoner's thigh. The German, who was terrified, remained motionless.

By this time the men in the shelter were so confused that when a smoke hand grenade was hurled through an aperture, they quickly obeyed an order to surrender.

The Germans were led to the amphitheater and then to the river. They had to swim across the river—"a hazardous venture," the prisoner remarked, "because of whirlpools created by the debris of the demolished bridges."

By the time they had reached the other side of the river, German artillery had opened up. The prisoner noticed that during the German artillery fire, British soldiers always hit the ground, whereas the German prisoners remained standing. This prisoner implied that long experience on the receiving end of artillery fire had taught the Germans to judge direction of fire and impact.

"The sureness of the execution and the fact that picked men were employed for the task made the raid a success," the prisoner commented. He spoke with respect of the use of rubber soles, daggers, blackened faces, and so on, and of the fire power of the light automatic weapons. He said that he felt obliged to couple with these factors the inadequacy of the German defense of the sector. The positions were too far forward,

a central command was lacking, and no minefields had been prepared. Before the British attack, he said, he and the other men in the pillbox had discussed "the ridiculous defense layout."

The other prisoners corroborated this German's belief that the attack achieved absolute surprise in all parts of the sector.

## **Section VII. GERMAN TANK PLATOONS OPERATING AS POINTS**

---

This section discusses the composition and employment of German tank platoons operating as points. Although the information in this account comes from an unofficial source, it is believed to be substantially correct.

### **1. COMPOSITION**

The point platoon is generally made up of the platoon leader's tank and two sections of two tanks each. The platoon leader may place either the first or second section at the head of the point platoon, but he himself always stays between the two sections in order to observe his entire outfit. However, the composition of the point varies according to the situation.

The strength of the point platoon may be increased in mountainous terrain. During the German invasion of the Balkans, the point amounted to an extra-strong company and consisted of heavy tanks, assault weapons, tanks with the long 75-mm and 50-mm guns, an infantry platoon, and a detachment of engineers. A platoon of five Pz. Kw. 4's led the point. Behind them came a group of engineers, riding either on the last tanks in the point or on other tanks immediately fol-

lowing. After that came a platoon of self-propelled assault guns (four short-barreled 75-mm's), then the platoon of infantry riding in armored personnel carriers, and finally a platoon of five Pz. Kw. 3's. There were no motorcycle couriers.

At the historic Thermopylae Pass, in Greece, there were 22 tanks in the spearhead, but only three of these got through. A responsible German officer's comment on this was that it was worth losing the 19 tanks in order to achieve success with the three.

## **2. COMMUNICATION**

### **a. Within the Point Platoon**

In combat, communication within the German tank platoon operating as a point is done basically by radio. Up to that time, liaison is maintained by at least one or two motorcycle couriers attached to the platoon leader. As soon as contact with a hostile force is established, these couriers scatter to the sides and lie in ditches until the whole platoon has passed. They then go back to the company commander and report to him that contact has been made. After this, he carries on by radio.

### **b. Within the Armored Regiment**

As has been stated, there are five tanks in each platoon—two in each section and one for the platoon leader. The platoon leader and each section leader has a two-way radio; the two remaining tanks have receiv-

ing sets only. Regimental commanders and all three battalion commanders have special radio cars, each equipped with 100-watt sets. If the battalions (or companies) attack together, they have radio communication with the regiment. When they attack separately, each uses, in addition to his two-way radio (*Funk Gerät 5*), four sets capable only of receiving (*Funk Gerät 2's*). Each of these receiving sets is used for communication with one of the four companies. Moreover, each company is on a different frequency. In turn, each company commander has a two-way set and two receiving sets, and can speak with the battalion commander.

Each battalion, too, is normally on a different frequency. The platoon is on the same frequency as its company commander. Each platoon leader has his second receiving set tuned to the frequency of his battalion commander, in case his company commander should become a casualty.

If the regiment attacks as a unit, the network remains unchanged. However, if the battalions act independently, the regimental commander has no communication with them except by messengers, usually motorcyclists.

Code is used only with the 100-watt sets, from battalion up to division. During the attack, communication is in the clear, even up to the regimental commander. When battalions attack separately, how-

ever, they use code in communicating with the regimental commander.

The division commander alone authorizes messages in the clear. If the battalion commander cannot reach his regimental commander by using the two-way *Funk Gerät 5* (which has a range of 6 kilometers), he encodes his message and uses the 100-watt set.

### **3. ON THE MARCH**

#### **a. Combat Vehicles**

It is a German principle that the distance between the rear of the point platoon and the company commander must not be so great that the latter cannot see the former. It can be, but seldom is, as much as 1 kilometer. The spacing depends entirely on the terrain. All movement is made by road until a hostile force is encountered. The tanks then scatter to the sides. Even when there is danger of air attack, the tanks remain on the road but keep well apart. In mountainous country, when heavy tanks are used in the point, the method of advancing on roads is altered. Two tanks advance together, one behind the other but on the opposite side of the road.

The sections are easily interchangeable; for example, should the first section be at the head of the platoon and then leave the road to overcome hostile resistance, the second section can move to the head, allowing the first section to fall in behind when the resistance has

been overcome. The Germans believe that it is of the utmost importance to keep the platoon moving forward.

### b. Supply Column

During the campaign in Greece, all supply trucks were placed at the rear. In any other position they would have delayed the movement, because of the twisting mountainous roads. Any truck that was damaged was immediately shoved off the road to keep the column moving at all costs.

In more recent operations, when facing the possibility of a guerrilla attack from the front (rather than from the flank), the Germans have been known to sandwich elements of the supply column between tank platoons on the march. The important ration and fuel trucks have even traveled between tanks within a platoon. While this plan has not been followed by a point platoon, it has been employed by the platoons following immediately afterward in the line of march. The same plan has occasionally been used by German battalions on the march, but only when there has been a danger of attacks by guerrillas or when road conditions have been so bad that supply trucks have needed tanks close at hand at all times, for emergency towing.

## **Section VIII. NEW GERMAN EMPHASIS ON SALVAGING MATERIEL**

---

While United Nations air forces bomb German factories, the ground forces of these nations are destroying vital enemy matériel in combat. The importance of these combined blows against Germany's war economy, as well as against her military machine, is tremendous. The average U. S. soldier may not realize that to deprive the German Army of matériel of any kind is a great help in speeding victory. German leaders, however, are well aware of the extent of these blows, and are making every effort to impress their troops with the increased necessity for recovering and salvaging matériel.

One of the best illustrations of the German matériel shortage as it affects the individual soldier in the field is this typical regimental order regarding the loss of weapons and other equipment:

Recent heavy fighting has caused substantial casualties in killed, wounded, and missing. This alone, however, is not sufficient explanation for the losses in matériel that we have suffered. I am well aware that many members of this regiment—officers included—do not sufficiently realize their responsibility for the recovery and salvage of weapons and equipment, or even parts thereof, which have been damaged in combat. Moreover, and as a consequence of such losses, the

problem of replacing matériel is growing more and more difficult. Indeed, in some cases the problem absolutely cannot be solved. This leads to a dangerous weakening of our combat efficiency.

The reputation of our regiment will suffer disastrously if such losses continue. I do not propose to let this happen. On the contrary, I am determined to employ the severest punishment to end unsoldierly carelessness, wherever it exists.

I am convinced that commanders of all grades, despite the heavy strain under which they labor, will fully understand and support me in my efforts. This particularly applies to battalion and company commanding officers. With the foregoing in mind, I give the following order:

Putting aside all personal considerations, and renouncing their well-deserved hours of rest, the battalion, company, platoon, and squad leaders will thoroughly investigate and explain all matériel losses suffered during the past month and, as of today, will report such losses after future engagements. The battalion and company commanders will personally certify by signature that these investigations are being conducted with the utmost thoroughness and that the troops have been instructed regarding the consequences the individual soldier will have to face if he cannot justify the loss of a weapon. It must be driven home to every soldier that he can avoid punishment by bringing back even some parts of the weapons and equipment entrusted to him. Furthermore, every soldier must be taught that even the smallest parts are valuable inasmuch as they can be used again in the manufacture of weapons.

I am fully aware of the additional paper work that these reports will involve. Their importance to the war effort, however, makes it necessary for me to call for them. On the other hand, if future losses in combat are avoided, the reports will not have to be made.

In order to investigate individual cases, use must also be made of those periods during which the unit is in reserve.

Within 48 hours after return to the rest area, units will file reports regarding losses of weapons and equipment. For every loss, one or more soldiers will be held responsible. These names will be listed in the report, as well as the action taken in each case. Units which have not suffered losses will file negative reports.

In addition to suffering losses of weapons and equipment in the course of military operations, the Germans continually lose matériel at the front through acts of sabotage. It will readily be seen that the aggregate loss, from all causes, constitutes an economic factor so great that whenever the U. S. soldier captures even a single piece of enemy equipment, or destroys it in action, he deals a much greater blow to the German war effort than he may realize at the time.

As to sabotage in the field, the following are characteristic of acts which recently have been committed against the flow of German motor traffic. This list, which comes from an authoritative source, demonstrates how elements friendly to the United Nations are helping the liberating armies to destroy the enemy's vital equipment and supplies.

- a. Fences around ditches on roads have been damaged in such a manner that vehicles have been in danger of driving into the ditches at night.
- b. Stone road blocks have been erected across roads after dark.
- c. Gasoline tanks have been filled with water, and gasoline pipes have been smashed.

- d. Hand grenades have been attached to parked motorcycles in such a manner that operation of the vehicles detonated the grenades.
- e. Nails have been sprinkled on roads. (Recently, new nails have been removed from nearly all flat tires.)

## **Section IX. SOME NOTES ON GERMAN INTELLIGENCE METHODS**

---

### **1. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS**

It cannot be stressed too often that German efforts to extract information from prisoners are not limited to open-and-aboveboard questioning, but have been known to include trickery of every conceivable kind. U. S. soldiers must realize that when a prisoner has been asked a number of questions during an interview and has told his captors, "I can give only my name, rank, and serial number," German scheming to break his security has only just begun.

In Rome there was a combined Italian and German camp for prisoners of war. The Germans, thwarted by the high sense of security that their prisoners displayed, resorted to the following ruse. After a soldier's means of personal identification had been taken away from him, he would be given an artificial chance to escape. When he was recaptured, the authorities then would pretend that they did not know him, and that they were unable to identify him as a combatant. They would threaten to regard him as a spy and to execute him unless he would truthfully answer a questionnaire covering some very detailed military information. A prisoner who was treated in this manner, and who of

course refused to divulge any information, was put into solitary confinement for eight days and nights, with rations of rice, bread, and water. After this, he was again given the questionnaire, and was told that he would be freed if he would answer it. When he refused a second time, he was kept in confinement for a few more days, and then was returned to a regular prisoner-of-war camp.

In an attempt to obtain information from an RAF noncom, the Germans asked him whether he would like to be sent to a permanent camp where he had friends. A list of personnel was read to him, in an effort to get him to indicate those he knew. His squadron leader, who was still in England, was included in the list.

On the day that this same noncom was to leave the transit camp, he was told that an RAF squadron leader had requested, and had been granted permission to meet all RAF personnel in the camp. The noncom was taken to an office where he was greeted cheerfully by a man who wore a squadron leader's uniform and who spoke English without a foreign accent. This man asked him how he had been treated, and expressed the hope that he had divulged nothing. The bogus officer then produced a notebook in which he said, he was compiling records that some day would be useful to the British Air Ministry. He asked many questions about the sergeant's squadron. When the prisoner refused to answer, he was threatened with a postwar charge for disobeying a superior officer, and finally was dismissed with curses.

An escaped British flight sergeant has given an account of how he was placed in a cell with two men dressed as Royal Tank Regiment officers, who told him their unit and asked him to tell his. They then showed him various articles that they were planning to use in an attempt to escape, and tried to lure him into a discussion of the possibilities of escaping by air. When the sergeant was questioned about forward airfields, he stated that he knew nothing about them. By this time his suspicions had been aroused, inasmuch as they did not know what "Mk V" on his service watch stood for. An observer in this sergeant's plane had exactly the same sort of experience with other stool pigeons posing as British officers.

The Germans generally make a point of having stool pigeons pose as belonging to a branch of service other than that to which a prisoner belongs. Obviously, the purpose of this is to make it easier for a stool pigeon to hide his ignorance of the many small, everyday details that he otherwise would be expected to know.

## **2. SIGNAL SECURITY AND INTERCEPTION**

A German prisoner, who served in the signal section of an armored division recently encountered in Italy, has described an intercept unit of from 10 to 15 sets which served with his division. Part of the unit was said to concentrate on locating and identifying all possible stations, down to company (and British squadron) level, while the other part listened to the nets thus

identified and selected those which afforded the best information. Identification was made by a careful analysis of the characteristics of each set and each operator.

The division's artillery regiment was said to have a special direction-finding component which apparently attempted to discover the area from which each projectile came. To do this, the Germans tried to intercept fire orders, locate the stations on the net concerned, and coordinate the results with reports of hostile shelling. This procedure was not especially successful.

The foregoing points very clearly to the fact that any carelessness with respect to communication security is extremely dangerous. The Germans are continuously hunting for random bits of free information.

A German artillery signalman captured in Italy made the following comment about signal procedures in his unit. The rule was that no use be made of uncoded references, even over the telephone. Battalions and batteries had code names, and the numerals 1, 2, or 3 following a code name related to the observation post, radio truck, or gun position, respectively. All radio messages were doubly coded, the key being changed every two hours. In actual combat the use of radio was reduced to a minimum because of unhappy experiences with hostile direction finding. As a further precaution, the radio truck was situated half a mile from the gun position.

## **Section X. GERMAN MULTIPURPOSE CARBIDE LANTERN**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

An unusual lantern, intended to serve a variety of purposes in the field, is now in use by the German Army. The lantern (see fig. 3) is made almost entirely of plastic, with a few parts made of zinc, aluminum, and glass. It is completely demagnetized. Although it is resistant to all weather conditions, it is less durable than steel or brass, and the Germans admit that it must be handled with care.

The most notable feature of this piece of equipment is its adaptability for different purposes. The principal means of illumination is acetylene gas (carbide), but candles may be substituted. The lantern can be dimmed or completely blacked out by means of zinc screens. There is a special front screen with a slotted slide for lighting reference points. Just above this there is a circular slide, which can be regulated to give varying amounts of light. Zinc side screens may be inserted to darken the sides of the lantern. When not in use, these screens are placed in a pocket at the rear of the lantern. A red or green glass pane can be inserted in the front of the lantern whenever a colored light is desired, as for prearranged signaling.




Figure 3.—German Multipurpose Carbide Lantern.

A spare-parts kit and a plastic container for carbide are issued for each lantern.

## 2. VARIETY OF USES

The German Army finds many uses for the carbide lantern. In the instruction booklet which accompanies each spare-parts kit, the enemy advises that the lantern be used:

- a. For lighting personnel and equipment shelters, including dugouts;
- b. For lighting small offices, communications centers, and improvised field stables;
- c. For lighting closed vehicles;
- d. For reading maps, compasses, and so on;
- e. For tunnel work, unless safety lamps are required because of explosive gases (the handle is fitted with a hook for work of this type);
- f. For railroad personnel;
- g. As a signal lantern for ponton bridge engineers.

## 3. METHOD OF OPERATION WITH CARBIDE

- a. The round carbide container, which also serves as the lantern's base, should be filled with small lumps of dust-free carbide up to the level of the three flanges on the inside. Then the perforated pressure cover, which is equipped with a spiral spring, is put on (with the spring turned upward). On this spring there is fitted a funnel with a little perforated tube, which points downward. After these preparations, the filled carbide

container is screwed firmly into the lantern. It is important to make certain that the rubber washer is in place.

If, after long use, the threads on the carbide container become dry, they should be greased lightly.

b. The setscrew with a drip needle in the center of the zinc water container must be screwed down firmly. The slotted screw cap at one side of the water container is then unscrewed, the water container is filled to the top, and the screw cap is replaced.

c. The setscrew is given a single turn to the left. Gas is produced by the water dripping into the carbide container. This gas seeps evenly through the burner.

d. The flame should be about 1/3 inch high, and should burn without hissing. If necessary, the setscrew to the water intake should be regulated.

e. One filling of water will allow the lantern to burn for at least 8 hours if the above directions are followed carefully.

f. After use, the parts which have come into contact with carbide must be cleaned. If this is not done, the life and intensity of the flame will be reduced.

g. Before the lantern is stored away, it should be drained of water. The setscrew should be well oiled.

#### **4. DEFECTIVE BURNING**

a. If gas leaks between the lantern and the carbide container, it is probable that the rubber washer has not been placed properly on the carbide container or that

the container itself has not been screwed tightly into the lantern.

b. If the lantern sputters, the slotted screw on the drip system between the water container and the lantern should be tightened with a screwdriver. This screw has a small rubber washer under it.

c. If the burner is stopped up, it must be cleaned with the special cleaning pin provided for this purpose. Any air leak should be sealed. If a new burner is to be inserted, its threads should be coated with the air-sealing substance carried in the spare-parts kit.

## 5. ACCESSORIES

The spare-parts kit contains seven candles, a candle-holding tube with push spring, a candle-holder base plate, four burners, a wooden case with burner cleaning pins, a large rubber washer for the carbide container and two small washers for sealing the drip system, a plastic container filled with an air-sealing preparation, a plastic container filled with "Stauffer" lubricant, a screwdriver, an extra side pane and an extra front pane (both of clear glass), a red front pane, a green front pane, and an instruction booklet.

## PART TWO: JAPAN

### **Section I. JAPANESE TANK TACTICS**

---

#### **1. GENERAL**

A study of information from reliable Japanese sources indicates that the enemy has made changes in his tactical organization and employment of tanks. He evidently has been experimenting with the idea of greatly increasing the concentration of armored strength in a given sector of combat.

One Japanese source illustrates the employment of three tank battalions with an infantry division in a theoretical attack against hostile positions on a front of 3,200 meters (approx. 3,500 yds.). The tanks (probably all light) are organized on a triangular basis: three platoons per company and three companies per battalion (see fig. 4). Apparently, under this new organization, three battalions would constitute a regiment, although the word "regiment" is not used by the Japanese. The plan of attack calls for employment of 135 tanks—45 per battalion, 15 per company, and 5 per platoon.

This organization, greatly increasing the number of tanks per unit, generally follows American and German principles, and indicates that the Japanese have




Figure 4.—Japanese Employment of Three Tank Battalions.

been studying these principles. The previously accepted enemy organization for the light tank company included 10 tanks.

The plan of attack with three battalions attached to an infantry division, as outlined in figure 4, calls for a closely coordinated tank-infantry attack, supported by artillery. This tie-up with infantry has been standard Japanese doctrine for several years. Although the Japanese are believed to have more than one armored division as such, it is apparent that most of their armor will continue to be used within, or attached to, infantry divisions or smaller units. On suitable terrain, this armor is likely to be employed: as a spearhead for infantry attacks, as an integral part of an infantry-tank combat team fighting almost side-by-side, as support for infantry, as an enveloping force, and as a raiding force.

## **2. USING THREE TANK BATTALIONS**

Details of the Japanese method of employing three tank battalions with an infantry division are illustrated in figure 4, which is reproduced from a reliable enemy source. Theoretically, the division is attacking on a front of about 2,500 meters (approx. 2,700 yds.) against "well-established" hostile positions covering a front of about 3,500 yards. The tank attack is being made in three waves or echelons. Two of the infantry regiments and two of the tank battalions are moving into the attack, while the third infantry regiment and the third tank battalion are in division reserve.

The first tank echelon consists of two tank companies, one in front of each front-line infantry regiment, under the direct control of the regimental commander. The mission of this echelon is to "neutralize antitank guns and strong fire points (which appear to be composed of strong tanks) and thus establish a passage for the main attacking force"—the second echelon.

The second tank echelon, moving 400 to 500 yards behind the first, consists of four tank companies, two in each regimental sector. Each company moves a short distance in front of an infantry battalion, four of which are in the front line. The tank companies are attached to these battalions and are under the battalion command in each case. These tanks "lead and support the attacking infantry." Depending on the situation, the support battalion of each front-line regiment may be called upon to "leap-frog" through the front-line troops and take up the attack.

The third tank echelon, consisting of one battalion, is held in reserve "under the direct control of the division commander." These tanks, "in order to exploit a battle success or to strengthen the division's striking power, may be employed to reinforce any area requiring it, or may be attached to any infantry unit as reinforcements," the Japanese state.

Previously established Japanese doctrine called for the use of only one tank company (consisting of 10 tanks) to each infantry regiment for such tank-infan-

try roles as outlined above. Apparently this was not enough armor for the Japanese. In a booklet titled "An Example of a Tank-unit Attack Formation," the enemy commented as follows:

For an attack on a lightly held position, 10 tanks are not sufficient; at least 30 to 40 are required. For an attack on a strongly established position, at least 60 tanks are necessary. It is necessary to increase the number of tanks from 60 to 100 when the strength of the position has been increased, or when bombing and shelling are intense.

The Japanese set forth the following "views" regarding the neutralization of antitank guns prior to the actual assault by tanks and infantry:

With the assault supporting fire, destroy or at least attempt to neutralize the hostile antitank guns. At the beginning of the attack, direct the artillery to neutralize the four to six hostile antitank guns in front of each battalion of attacking infantry. Draw out hostile antitank fire frequently by using a decoy tank prior to the actual assault. Then neutralize the antitank fire (at times using tanks as artillery).

### **3. USE OF TANKS ON TARAWA**

U. S. observers report that the Japanese had six or seven light tanks (Model 2595) in the defensive setup on Tarawa Island. Only two of these engaged in a tank-to-tank battle with our forces. The others were knocked out by naval and other gunfire.

After U. S. forces had captured the airport, and after the latter had been bombed by the Japanese, an enemy tank came out of a revetment, apparently to determine what damage had been done by the bombing.

Flying the Rising Sun flag, the enemy tank approached two U. S. medium tanks, turned while several hundred yards away, turned around again, and fired two rounds while approaching our tanks. Having missed its target, the enemy tank then did an about face and fled.

In another engagement, an armor-piercing shell from a U. S. medium tank tore the turret off the top of a Japanese light tank and put it out of action.

Except while in low gear, the Model 2595 light tank is not well adapted for movement over rough terrain. In low gear, it can cross fairly high obstacles and climb steep slopes. It can operate in water up to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet deep and travel up to 90 miles without refueling.

This tank is highly vulnerable to close-in attack by small weapons, such as sticky grenades and Molotov cocktails. It can be set afire easily. Therefore, incendiary weapons are particularly valuable for combatting it at close quarters. No weapon in the tank can be depressed lower than 20 degrees below the horizontal, thereby leaving a dead space extending 23 feet in all directions from the tank, as shown in figure 5. Shaded areas have .25-inch armor and are the most vulnerable spots to small-arms fire and incendiary grenades. A man within this distance of the tank is not only in a favorable position to use his weapons, but he is comparatively safe from any of the tank's weapons.

In every strategic area of the island, the Japanese




Figure 5.—Dead Space around Japanese Model 2595 Light Tank.

had built tank revetments, which were located so that tanks in them could fire at soldiers and boats crossing the reef or at other suitable targets (see fig. 6). Most of the revetments were mutually supporting with other defense weapons. The revetments were located singly, indicating that the tanks were to be operated individually in defense of the island.

The revetments sloped into the ground. The coconut-log sides extended about 4 feet above ground level. The tanks were driven forward into the revetments, permitting the 37-mm guns to fire to the front. To get into action, the tanks had to back out of the revetments and then turn around.




Figure 6.—Japanese Tank Revetment (Tarawa).

## **Section II. JAPANESE ANTIACRAFT AND COASTAL DEFENSES**

---

### **1. GENERAL**

Considerable information on Japanese antiaircraft and coastal defenses has been obtained through photographic reconnaissance and actual study of captured positions. This section contains, among other items, a number of illustrations showing various patterns and details of these positions. Reference may be made to *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 6, pages 45-48, for information previously carried on the subject.

#### **a. As to Location**

The Japanese make a general practice of locating antiaircraft positions so that they will serve a dual, or even a triple, purpose. If defending an area along a seacoast, the enemy locates positions so that the guns can fire on hostile ships and landing boats as well as on hostile aircraft or ground troops. Batteries usually are found within 1 mile of airfields or camp sites. The guns are generally concentrated between the airfields or camp sites and the sea approaches, or along the shore. The light batteries are rarely placed outside the 1-mile radius, except along beaches. The heavies have been located as far as 5 miles from defended areas.

In the South Pacific, battery positions along the shore often appear in natural clearings, or in clearings that have been enlarged. Usually they are located on ridges or on the sides of ridges. Nearby trees are utilized as cover for personnel and supplies. If a battery located near the shore has an arc or linear pattern, with no obstructions between it and the sea, it can safely be assumed that the guns are used for coastal defense as well as for antiaircraft purposes.

### **b. As to Construction**

Generally speaking, Japanese gun emplacements are constructed similar to those of other nations at war. In most batteries the emplacements are circular in plan. However, it is common for this shape to be modified by ready magazines, dugouts, and so forth which project from the circle. Blast walls before entrances, drainage ditches, entrance ramps, and double revetments are additional features of an emplacement.

In the South Pacific area, where gun batteries usually are hastily emplaced, the simple circular emplacement predominates. In most of these cases ammunition is kept in small buildings and dugouts near each emplacement. It must be noted, however, that emplacements will tend to become more complex (that is, have more added features connected directly with the emplacement) if the battery remains at the same location for some time. The original construction for the establishment of a battery usually involves only the building

of simple circular emplacements, often without entrances. Later, entrances are cut through, ready magazines are added, blast walls are constructed, and control positions and personnel shelters are built.

In the Southwest Pacific, the antiaircraft batteries have a more permanent aspect, although examples of the simple circular emplacement are common. For example, at Kavieng, New Ireland, ready magazines are built into bulges in the revetments, and, in some cases, blast walls are present before the entrance to the emplacement.

Individual emplacements for batteries located deep within Japanese-held areas are generally more elaborate than those found to date. At Soerabaja, Java, emplacements for a 75-mm antiaircraft battery have high sandbag revetments with ammunition ready magazines constructed in the sides of the revetments. The revetments are covered with sod, and their inner walls are lined with vertically placed lumber.

### c. As to Patterns

In grouping their gun emplacements, the Japanese generally place them in one of four patterns: in an arc, in a line, in a triangle, or in a rough rectangle (trapezoid). The typical heavy antiaircraft position usually consists of six guns. However, this number has varied from 2 to 12 guns. Four-gun positions have been found frequently in the past. The number of guns in light antiaircraft positions is apt to vary considerably, de-

pending on the number of weapons available. Both light and heavy positions are likely to have the support of machine guns, sited either within the position or at a short distance from it. When an antiaircraft position is located on or immediately inshore of a beach, supporting machine guns usually are sited on the edge of the beach.

#### **d. As to Camouflage**

Except for the use of sod to cover revetments, the Japanese until recent months made little effort to conceal antiaircraft positions. However, they are now utilizing palm-frond canopies quite extensively in camouflaging open emplacements. Rope netting is also used to some extent. Several antiaircraft batteries at Vila, Kolombangara Island, were emplaced in coconut groves with apparently little regard for firing obstructions. The Japanese also have made considerable use of dummy positions, dummy planes, and unserviceable planes as decoys.

### **2. EXAMPLES OF POSITIONS**

Heavy U. S. bombing attacks apparently have forced the Japanese to adopt antiaircraft defenses designed to afford maximum protection for weapons and gun crews. For example, at Kavieng, New Ireland, the Japanese have built double-revetted emplacements for 25-mm automatic weapons. Around the first revetment is a second one of like strength and construction.

**SUMMARY OF CALIBER AND EMPLACEMENT SIZES (APPROXIMATE)  
OF THE MORE COMMON JAPANESE ANTI AIRCRAFT AND COASTAL-DEFENSE WEAPONS**

	Caliber	Inside Diameter of Emplace- ment	AA	Coastal Defense	Dual Purpose	Remarks
Light	7.7-mm	6 to 8 ft	X			Weapon captured on Attu was in 10-foot emplacement.
	13-mm	8 to 10 ft			X	Found also as twin mount; weapon captured on Guadalcanal was in 10- to 12-ft emplacement.
	20-mm	8 to 15 ft			X	Inner diameter should average about 12 ft. Emplacements 8, 9, and 10 feet wide found on Attu.
	25-mm	12 to 14 ft			X	Triple mount captured on Guadalcanal in 14-ft emplacement. Twin mount on Kiska in 15-ft emplacement.
	40-mm	10 to 12 ft	X			Twin mount captured at Munda in 10- to 12-ft emplacement.
Heavy	75-mm	18 to 20 ft			X	Batteries captured on Attu were in 18- to 20-ft emplacements. With spiders covered, a 15-ft emplacement is adequate.
	105-mm	20 to 24 ft			X	Photos of emplacement at unknown locality measured approximately 24 ft in inner diameter.
	127-mm	22 to 26 ft		X	X	Captured battery on Kiska was located in 22-ft emplacements. Coastal-defense battery captured on Kiska was in 20-ft emplacements.

X—indicates purpose of weapon

The outer revetment is higher than the top of the inner one. This affords better protection of the gun and crew, but it limits the minimum angle of depression at which the gun may fire.

An ammunition and personnel shelter has been built into the wall of the outer revetment, from which it projects. This shelter, covered with logs, affords good protection for gun crews and ammunition handlers. Its closeness to the gun insures a rapid flow of ammunition, while its construction and location minimize the danger to the gun crew in case of a direct hit.

The interiors of these emplacements are revetted with heavy logs and timber or with concrete.

#### **a. Six-gun Heavy Battery (Attu)**

Figure 7 is an over-all view of a Japanese six-gun antiaircraft battery on an Attu beach. This wide arc pattern is a typical arrangement for six-gun heavies in a dual-purpose role. The emplacements measured 18 to 20 feet in inner diameter and were about 5 feet deep. Small dugouts were located in the inner walls of the revetments for ammunition storage. From such emplacements, tunnels frequently lead into nearby living quarters. Note the trenches and foxholes.

#### **b. Combination of Batteries (Burma)**

Figure 8 illustrates the Japanese use of more than one antiaircraft battery in a position (Rangoon, Burma). Three heavy batteries and one light battery, plus ten machine guns, constitute the combined de-

fense. Note that two gun emplacements are empty in each of the heavy batteries at the top of the illustration. Also note the arc arrangements with command posts centrally located. The heavies are probably 75-mm (Model 88) antiaircraft guns, while the lights are probably 20-mm (Model 98) dual-purpose machine cannon.




Figure 7.

### c. Combination of Batteries (Kolombangara)

This Japanese arrangement of two heavy anti-aircraft batteries, supported by emplaced machine guns, varies from others in that five guns per battery are utilized instead of six or four (see fig. 9). Note that the arc arrangements for the two batteries curve in opposite directions.




Figure 8.




Figure 9.




Figure 10.




Figure 11.

#### d. Light Battery on Mounds

At Heho airfield in Burma the Japanese have a three-gun light battery on clay-covered mounds (see fig. 10). Two of the three mounds also have machine-gun emplacements. The lights are 20-mm machine cannon. Note that ammunition is probably stored between two of the light antiaircraft positions.

#### e. Heavy AA-Coastal Defense Battery

Figure 11 shows a six-gun heavy dual-purpose battery near the Kahili airfield, Bougainville Island. Note

the thick revetments, shore location, and inner diameters of emplacements—all of which help to make this position suitable for coast defense. The caliber of these guns may be 105-mm.

#### f. Three-gun AA-Coastal Defense Battery

A Japanese three-gun heavy dual-purpose battery, located on Wake Island, is shown in figure 12. Note the thick revetments, blast walls, and heavily revetted command post. These are large-caliber guns.




Figure 12.

## **Section III. TWO AA/AT POSITIONS<sup>1</sup>**

---

### **1. GENERAL**

Details of two Japanese antiaircraft-antitank positions, designed for all-around defense, are presented below. This information, from reliable Japanese sources, deals with the construction of a machine-cannon battery position and the construction of an antiaircraft battery position. The former apparently is designed for the enemy's Model 98 (1938) 20-mm antiaircraft-antitank machine cannon, while the latter probably is designed primarily for the Model 88, 75-mm antiaircraft gun, which also has been employed by the Japanese as an antitank weapon. Such positions, according to the Japanese, can be constructed in two weeks. It is believed that these positions are "models" and represent developments that are largely theoretical. No reports of their actual existence have been received.

### **2. MACHINE-CANNON BATTERY POSITION**

Figure 13 is a sketch of the machine-cannon position. Although it appears to be designed for the 20-mm dual-purpose machine cannon, the Japanese may also use

<sup>1</sup> In connection with this section, reference may profitably be made to Section II of this issue, to "Antiaircraft Positions" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 6 pp. 45-48), and to "Defense of Betio Island" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 1-35).




Figure 13.—Japanese Machine-cannon Battery Position.




Figure 14.—Japanese Antiaircraft Battery Position.

other types of guns in such positions. For example, they have employed the Model 41, 75-mm mountain gun (an infantry weapon) in an antitank role, firing an armor-piercing round.

It is interesting to note, among other things, the octopus-like arrangement of communication trenches, all of which are supposed to be covered from aerial observation. There are a total of eight gun emplacements, two per platoon. Personnel shelters are provided for each gun emplacement, and a shelter-protected ammunition dump is provided for each platoon. The antitank trenches and mines are undoubtedly located in the areas most suited for tank attacks.

### **3. ANTI AIRCRAFT BATTERY POSITION**

Figure 14 is a sketch of the Japanese antiaircraft battery position. Although it has only four gun emplacements, the general setup follows the same pattern as the machine-cannon position. Note that on the right side of the position the antitank trench-minefield defenses extend to the stream.

## **Section IV. HOW A COMBAT PATROL CAPTURED TWO JAPANESE**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Details of how a U. S. combat patrol dealt successfully with a Japanese patrol in New Guinea are presented below. These details were carefully planned and carefully executed, and are recited here because they may be helpful to U. S. patrols in future operations.

The patrol was led by Lieutenant A, who a few months before had received a Distinguished Service Cross for his action—as a noncommissioned officer—at Sanananda. He suggested the patrol operation and asked permission to lead it. He selected 10 enlisted men, without regard for grades and ratings, and a number of natives to constitute the patrol. The enlisted men, all volunteers, had had considerable experience in patrolling against the Japanese.

The military personnel were equipped with carbines, Browning automatic rifles, and Garand rifles. The natives, unarmed, carried an eight-day supply of "J" rations (for jungle use—now discontinued), extra ammunition, and rice and bully beef for themselves. They also carried the automatic rifles most of the time.

The patrol operation took place in the area of Old Yagomi, about 70 miles southeast of Madang.

## 2. THE NARRATIVE

The patrol left Sel about mid-morning 23 January 1944, bivouacked overnight at Talmio village, and arrived in the vicinity of an observation post southwest of Old Yagomi at 1530. At this observation post, Lieutenant A obtained considerable information about Japanese activities in the area, and decided to set up an ambush on two trails about 500 yards from the mouth of the Yaut river.

The patrol was split. Lieutenant A took seven men to cover the trail most likely to be used by the Japanese, and Lieutenant B—who had come up to relieve the observation-post officer—took three men from the patrol and two from the observation post to cover the second trail. Both parties bivouacked in the vicinity of the observation post the night of 24-25 January. Most of the native carriers were left in this vicinity when the ambush was set on 25 January.

Two men took up positions as shown in (2) and (3), figure 15. They were to allow the leading Japanese soldier to walk into the defile and were to jump on the second enemy soldier from the rear as he started down into the defile. The patrol leader, Lieutenant A, was in position (1). He was to jump down upon the first Japanese as soon as the men in (2) started the action. A rifleman at position (7) was to shoot the third Japanese as soon as (2) and (3) had leaped down from behind their log. At the same time a Browning automatic rifleman at position (6) was to fire on the re-




Figure 15.—Diagram of Ambush by U. S. Patrol.

maining Japanese. The rifleman at position (8) was to fire on any target which might endanger the execution of the plan. The men behind the rock, positions (4) and (5), were to assist where they were needed. The men at positions (2), (3), (4), and (5) were not allowed to have their arms with them, because the patrol leader was afraid someone would get excited and start shooting—he wanted to take the first two Japs alive. However, the Americans' rifles (carbines) were kept in convenient places nearby.

A police boy was posted on the high cliff (9) overlooking the Yaut river (see fig. 15) with instructions to come back and notify Lieutenant A as soon as the Japanese started crossing the river. The patrol leader figured he would have about 20 minutes' warning of the approach of the Japanese patrol. A few native carriers, to carry back the two expected prisoners, were left about 200 yards in rear of the patrol.

The ambush proceeded exactly as planned. At 0940, 25 January, the police boy came back and told Lieutenant A that six Japanese had crossed the river. About 30 minutes later the enemy patrol approached at a fairly brisk pace along the straight portion of the trail. The leading Japanese held his rifle at approximately the "port-arms" position, and moved about 5 yards ahead of the second man. The third enemy soldier closed on the heels of the second man as the latter approached the small log behind which our men at position (2) and (3) were hidden. The third

Japanese was so close that when he was shot, by the rifleman at (7), his rifle fell on one of the two men jumping on the second Japanese. Meanwhile, according to plan, Lieutenant A jumped on his man and the Browning automatic rifleman mowed down the three remaining Japanese. The second Jap was subdued without difficulty. Lieutenant A had a fierce struggle with his foe, a big man, and had to club him over the head with his pistol and knock him out.

The whole show was over in 30 seconds. Except for Lieutenant A, who was bitten on the hand, the U. S. patrol suffered no casualties. Both captives were stripped of clothing except pants and shoes. The unconscious Jap was tied to a pole and carried out by the native carriers, who had come forward, and the other prisoner, securely tied, was walked out. As the patrol hurried out of the immediate area, a rear guard consisting of the Browning automatic rifleman and a man with a carbine covered the movement.

No other Japs were seen. The police boys obliterated all tracks to keep other Japanese from determining the strength of the U. S. patrol. The four dead Japanese were left on the ground. The unconscious Japanese soon recovered and his wounds were bandaged. He and the other prisoner were securely bound and guarded while the patrol bivouacked the night of 25-26 January.

Lieutenant A attributes the success of the operation to:

- a. Good planning and reconnaissance;

- b. Proper use of the police boys;
- c. Cool-headed action by each member of the patrol;  
and
- d. Split-second timing.

## **Section V. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES**

---

### **1. GENERAL**

Some Japanese measures concerning intelligence and security are presented below. For additional information on these subjects, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pages 43-46, and the following issues of Vol. I: No. 12, pages 65-71; No. 10, page 86; No. 8, pages 58-59; and No. 6, pages 16-17.

Japanese intelligence apparently was not completely up to date on U. S. equipment at the time our forces landed on Makin Island. The defending enemy troops evidently thought our amphibious personnel carriers (alligators) were landing boats, and waited for the infantry to disembark before opening fire. When the alligators came out of the water, the Japanese fled their positions, apparently believing the alligators were tanks.

That the Japanese are interested not only in details of U. S. arms and equipment but also in the characteristics of the U. S. soldier is borne out from the following quotation from an enemy treatise:

It is very important to know the enemy [Americans]. What about him? If you do not know the enemy, you cannot prepare against him. If you understand the enemy's way of

thinking and the combat methods he has used in the past, you can make preparations before you oppose him.

## 2. ENEMY VIEWS ON HANDLING PRISONERS

The views of a Japanese naval ensign on handling prisoners of war are presented below. While these views are not necessarily enemy doctrine, it is believed that they are pretty well in line with Japanese thought on the subject. The ensign's views tend to verify that the enemy is very much interested in prisoner-of-war information, and that he is aware of the talkative tendencies of some United Nations soldiers. The ensign's views:

- a. Insofar as possible, prisoners should be picked up separately.
- b. Conversation and communication between prisoners should be restricted.
- c. Captured documents, messages, and other items of intelligence value should be used in connection with the interrogation of prisoners. These should be studied and arranged in a manner convenient for reference. The main idea is to get the prisoners to interpret these documents as completely as possible.
- d. In interrogating, force should be the guiding principle. Because the prisoner's native language is different from ours, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to give a detailed examination, or to use indirect-questioning methods (especially when the interrogator lacks confidence in his vocabulary). Therefore, it is easier (for the interrogator) to conduct a formal interview. The feeling that the victor is superior and the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should demand that questions and answers be made in writing.

e. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the prisoner should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become physically exhausted. Consideration should be given to his quarters, food and drink, surveillance, and so forth.

### **3. BURYING ARMS AND EQUIPMENT**

Reliable Japanese sources indicate that the enemy often buries arms and equipment he cannot evacuate during withdrawals.

The following order was issued to a Japanese unit:

All unrequired ammunition will be buried in order to prevent hostile forces from using it when they penetrate our position.

Another unit received the following order:

If time permits, bury the gun in a safe location. The breech-block and gun sight will be removed and carried back at the time of retreat.

U. S. troops are warned that the Japanese have been known to booby-trap buried arms and equipment, and that the proper precautions should be taken when this buried "treasure" is located.

### **4. STANDARDS FOR CENSORING MAIL**

Within recent months the Japanese have adopted the following standards for censoring mail:

a. In letters you will not mention any unusual condition of forces, any Army plans, or any thoughts that might affect morale at home.

b. You will make no comment regarding unit dispositions, supplies and allowances, or any other matter that would be militarily injurious.

- c. You will not even hazard a guess as to the sector of operations or your location.
- d. You will not refer to the progress of operations, or to our losses (personnel, equipment, supplies, and so forth).
- e. You will not mention identification numbers of forces or names of commanding officers above the rank of force commanders.
- f. You may write about air attacks, but not about the effectiveness of our antiaircraft weapons and so forth.
- g. You will not mention anything about low morale or make any comment which might become the source of wild rumors.
- h. You will not make exaggerated comments concerning hardships or suffering in the combat zones.
- i. You will not write about any lingering desire to go home, or about any matter that might lead those at home to presume our morale is low.

## **Section VI. IMPROVISED LAND MINE USED BY JAPANESE**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

Numerous types of explosive charges have been improvised by the Japanese since the start of the war, including land mines and booby traps. A recent report from the South Pacific describes a crudely constructed, makeshift land mine that the enemy is using. The mine cannot be regarded as very dependable, and it is not clear whether its use is due to a shortage of the Model 93 land mine or to an attempt by the enemy to improvise a mine with a heavier charge than the Model 93.<sup>1</sup>

### **2. DESCRIPTION**

Figure 16 shows one of these mines as a whole and also the top cover. The mine container is a rectangular box with a cover securely fastened by friction tape. Since the mine is designed for its blast effect, rather than for fragmentation, the box may be made of any light metal, wood, or plastic. The box contains 12 blocks of explosive, each wrapped in wax black paper, and either a Model 91 or 97 hand grenade. Two holes are punched through the cover. The grenade fuze

<sup>1</sup> For details of the Model 93 land mine, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 2-5.




Figure 16.—Japanese Improvised Land Mine.

sticks through one of the two holes, projecting about  $\frac{3}{8}$  inch outside. The other hole is for a detonator in case one is used instead of the grenade. A small piece of string is tied around the box and looped through the friction tape.

Should the Japanese attempt to utilize this weapon as an antitank mine, they would have to remove the safety pin on the grenade. Then, if the fuze is hit a hard blow, the bursting charge will explode after a delay of 4 to 5 seconds and set off the charge.

The weapon may also be used as an antipersonnel mine or booby trap.

The effect of this mine has not yet been tested.

## **Section VII. JAPANESE HINTS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

A Japanese treatise, "Hints for the Soldier," has been circulated in some areas of the South Pacific during recent months. This treatise places renewed emphasis on such matters as individual firing of small-caliber weapons, hand-to-hand combat, and physical endurance. It recognizes that the hostile forces have a "superior number of weapons," and recommends measures to overcome this handicap.

### **2. THE TREATISE**

Unfounded self-confidence arising from the tradition that "we've always won" is of no great value. Confidence in victory should be based on superior physical endurance and thorough training. It is essential that a soldier be proficient in the use of firearms, in the use of cold steel, and in marching.

---

With regard to shooting, large quantities of ammunition are seldom available at the front; therefore expert marksmanship must be developed during the training period. The principle "Get a man with every round" is very sound. This is particularly important with regard to heavy weapons. You must avoid random firing; aim your shots well.

Train yourself to fire rifles and light machine guns from the hip, and to fire the grenade discharger in a horizontal position.

[Under such circumstance the Japanese probably press the discharger against a tree, log, stump, or rock]. In this manner, you should be able to fire these weapons without conscious effort in case hostile forces make an unexpected attack. If we immediately take the initiative, the hostile forces will throw away their arms and flee; conversely, it is essential not to let the opposition take the initiative.

---

When fired upon unexpectedly by hostile artillery, deploy and lie prone without moving.

Go about your duties silently. Hostile forces will fire blindly in the direction from which they hear the sound of voices.

Never neglect to dig in whenever you make a halt; always remember that digging in is essential, whether you are going to attack or to be attacked.

Deploying and crawling will reduce casualties, and are the first steps toward victory. It should be known that if you deploy and conceal yourself there will be no casualties from hostile bombing, or from rifle or artillery fire.

A soldier should never forget his camouflage.

No soldier should lose his direction. When assigned as a runner or on a patrol, mark your direction by breaking branches of trees or by making notches on the bark of trees as you go out.

---

You should engage in bayonet practice every day, with real weapons. Practice until the mind, the body, and the weapon are all coordinated in a perfect forward thrust. Drive the bayonet home to the hilt, and immediately tackle a second and third "enemy". Such practice is excellent for the morale.

Hand-to-hand combat is the deciding factor in an engagement, and is most feared by the American and Australian forces.

---

Do not allow yourself to be captured, even if the alter-

native is death. Bear in mind that capture disgraces not only the Army but also your parents and family, who will never be able to hold up their heads again. Always save the last round for yourself.

Endure all hardships. Shortage of rations is a normal condition. The saying "Poverty dulls the wit" should not hold true for military men.

## **Section VIII. MORALE, CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS**

---

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

The information presented in this section supplements data which have appeared in previous issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin* regarding the morale and individual characteristics of Japanese soldiers. For a complete reference to this data, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 8, p. 69, and Vol. II, No. 9, pp. 44-47.

### **2. A LIEUTENANT SPEAKS OUT**

A statement made by a Japanese lieutenant describes the hardships forced upon the enemy in New Guinea by the American and Australian air, ground, and naval forces. The statement, which ends with boasting threats, is presented below.

In air power, to put it briefly, we are about a century behind America and Germany. We who have participated in the New Guinea fighting are in position to appreciate at first hand the importance of air power. Those living in peace and safety at home talk about our air superiority in China. This is exceedingly childish chatter. If you have not experienced a continuous bombardment by formations of Lockheeds and North Americans, or 50 to 60 bombers, a true appreciation of air superiority is well nigh impossible.

This present war is termed a war of supply. Shipping is

the key to victory or defeat. To have regular shipping lanes, air superiority is essential. Ah! If we only had air superiority! Even the privates here voice the same opinion.

Let us examine the situation. In the battle for Salamaua, we were bombed and strafed relentlessly day and night for about six months. We left Sio with 10 days' rations, which must last for 25 days. . . . We fight while eating only grass. However, we must not complain about it to our superior officers. Since coming to New Guinea, I fully appreciate the value of even 1 gram of rice. If we only had salt and matches in the combat area, we could cope with anything. Indeed, these are supposed to be absolutely essential. How laughable! A certain labor unit existed for about two weeks on only pumpkin.

What of the Americans and Australians? They can boast only of their material power. Wait and see! We will wage a war of annihilation. The feelings of every officer and man throughout the Army are churning with a desire to massacre all Americans and Australians.

### **3. DEATH AND THE JAPANESE SOLDIER**

Before entering a theater of operations, the Japanese prepare themselves for possible death. Fingernails, toenails, and locks of hair are often taken from every man in a unit, and when a soldier is killed these items are sent to his family in Japan. Also, whenever possible, the ashes of deceased soldiers are sent home, generally by special courier. That this is an important and solemn pilgrimage is apparent from the following story written by a private and published in a Japanese magazine:

On this occasion I have returned from the front bringing the remains of the fallen soldiers. In the Army we regard

these ashes as more precious than living beings. When we were on board ship we were given strict instructions by the officer-in-charge as follows:

"You are about to cross seas that are dominated by enemy submarines. You know now what may befall you. If the ashes of those who have fallen in battle are lost and their spirits are again made to meet a second death, we who are responsible for bringing home these ashes will be without excuse before their bereaved families. Whatever happens, even though the ship sinks, do all you can to save these ashes."

This officer-in-charge is fond of his glass, but throughout the whole voyage he never touched a drop of *sake*. Every one of us in charge of these boxes of ashes kept them by our sides continually. At night we tied them to our waists with a rope attached to a life belt, so that if we were struck by a torpedo and had to dive overboard, though we might be drowned, the boxes of ashes would certainly float.

#### **4. MISCELLANEOUS BRIEFS**

The following items, loosely related, give further insight into Japanese morale and characteristics:

Just before a big counterattack against U. S. forces at Torokina on Bougainville, Japanese officers tried to boost the morale of their men by telling them that there were enough rations and tobacco within the U. S. lines to supply the Japanese for three years if they could be captured.

Such statements have been made by Japanese officers on other occasions for the same purpose.

---

A Japanese soldier dejectedly stated that U. S. weapons "are made for jungle warfare and are superior

in quality. If we had their weapons, we could annihilate them in one day. Unfortunately we haven't them!"

---

Members of a Japanese unit on Bougainville were exhorted as follows:

The time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of a sharp sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack, assault, and destroy everything. Cut, slash, and mow them [Americans] down. May the color of the red emblem [probably refers to the red insignia of the 6th Division] of memory on our arms be deepened with the blood of the American rascals. Our cry of victory at Torokina Bay will be shouted resoundingly to our native land. We are invincible. Always attack...

---

An officer who has returned from duty in the Pacific theater of operations debunks any feeling that the Japanese soldier possesses anything approaching "super" qualities. This officer said:

"I feel that it was a mistake to be given the idea, as we were, that the Jap is practically an unconquerable superman. We had repeated lectures to this effect."

## PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

### **Section I. SOUVENIR HUNTING IS STILL A PROBLEM**

---

Souvenir hunting in combat zones continues to be a matter requiring caution. It is perhaps hard for some men to realize that a scrap of paper or a small metal plate with a few words in a foreign language on it can be of great ultimate significance in analyzing the military and economic resources of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>

Because of the activities of souvenir hunters during operations on more than one Pacific island, much material of known and probable value was carried away, and almost all enemy documents, personal papers, weapons, and equipment were so rummaged through and scattered about that their eventual salvage was either unnecessarily delayed or rendered impossible. Souvenir hunting was not confined to any one unit or group, but was undertaken by construction

<sup>1</sup> In connection with this section, reference should be made to two articles which have previously appeared in the *Intelligence Bulletin*: "Souvenir Hunters Cause Needless Loss of Lives" (Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 72-74) and "Three Jeers for the Souvenir Sap" (Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 80-82).

<sup>2</sup> A letter dealing with "Destruction by Souvenir Hunters of Valuable Intelligence Data" was recently sent by the Adjutant General to the major commands, overseas theaters, and base commands. (AG 386.3, 2 March 1944, OB-S-B-M, 10 March 1944).

battalions, defense forces, and ship's crews—personnel who came ashore after the assault phase had been completed. Not that there had been any lag between the assault and the beginning of the souvenir hunting. Even by mid-afternoon of the first day, considerable damage had been done, for houses, stores, and barracks had been stripped almost as fast as they had been taken.

As experienced observers have pointed out, every effort must be made, through training, indoctrination, and briefing immediately before an operation, to minimize indiscriminate souvenir hunting and to insure the utmost cooperation between troops and construction units on one hand and intelligence personnel on the other.

At present there is a vital need for every available name plate from enemy matériel of every description. It is essential that, whenever possible, the name plate be left on the captured equipment to which it pertains. In recent weeks an increasing number of loose name plates have been confiscated from the mails by censors. Although it is a War Department policy that military personnel be treated as generously as possible when they request permission to retain souvenirs, it is obvious that items of intelligence value must be held for examination by the proper authorities. Experience has shown again and again that the most trivial-looking items can reveal desperately needed information concerning the enemy.

Sometimes it has proved advisable to post guards over captured command posts, radio stations, supply dumps, and so on, so that documents and matériel can be examined thoroughly without having been subjected to previous handling and the resulting damage and loss.

The responsibility for turning in for examination any random documents or pieces of equipment found by military personnel of course rests directly with the officers in charge of the various units involved in an operation.

The brighter side of the picture—and there very definitely is a brighter side—is illustrated by the following statement by a high-ranking U. S. officer who fought the Japanese on Rendova:

"If handled properly, souvenir collecting pays dividends; if not, it hurts morale and ruins an excellent source of information. Our rule was that a soldier could keep a souvenir if he were given clearance by his company commander, the Intelligence officer, and the Ordnance officer. The men cooperated wonderfully, and it was through 'souvenirs' brought in by collectors that we knew, two hours after we reached Rendova, the enemy's strength and disposition of troops over the previous two months' period."

## **Section II. SECURITY NOTES**

---

### **1. RUMORS**

From a Southwest Pacific Command, there comes a new version of an old anecdote which is a discerning, if indirect, comment on the gullibility of human nature.

"A real estate man arrived at the gates of Heaven, confident that he already had an option on a piece of property there, inasmuch as he had never robbed widows or orphans—at least, not much."

"St. Peter was adamant, however. 'There's no room for you,' he said. 'All allotments set aside for real estate men have already been taken up on perpetual lease.'

"Although no longer on his native heath, the applicant still had some of the earthly instincts of all successful real estate agents. He asked permission just to come in and look around. All was as St. Peter had said. So the real estate man stepped up onto a bench on the main boulevard and shouted, 'Oil has been discovered in Hell!'

"There was instant pandemonium and a mad exodus of real estate men, complete with hastily packed suitcases, rushing off to Hell. St. Peter watched the newcomer's face light up with satisfaction at his own cleverness and then slowly cloud over with worry. Sud-

denly the newcomer, too, grabbed his suitcase and raced after the real estate men. As he gathered speed, he shouted back to St. Peter, 'You know, there may be something to that rumor!' ”

Unfortunately, there is a large element of psychological truth in this story. Rumors are contagious, and affect not only those among whom they are spread, but also the rumor-monger himself.

## **2. SENSE AND CENSORSHIP**

Most breaches of security that censors come across are clearly not intentional. They stem from a soldier's ignorance of what he should and should not write in a letter, or from his faulty judgment as to what may be included without breaching security.

Intentional breaches are nearly always caused by someone's desire to appear clever, and are very seldom committed with treasonable intent. An example of the former was the case of a soldier who filled a letter with classified matters which he thought would entertain the folks at home, and entrusted it to a friend who was returning to the States. ("Don't let the postmark of this letter surprise you, because I'm not at home—" his letter began.) This use of unauthorized channels to carry mail from the field to persons at home is a flagrant violation of censorship, and subjects not only the writer, but the carrier as well, to severe disciplinary action. This particular writer committed an even graver violation, however. In his letter he disclosed in detail:

- a. his movements through the South Pacific area from the beginning of 1943, specifically mentioning dates and places;
- b. the casualties of units in combat;
- c. the movements of other units, and
- d. enough information about military plans for the future to endanger the success of an entire operation.

Besides inviting court-martial, this man jeopardized the lives of his fellow soldiers.

Press associations, newspapers, and radio stations sometimes unwittingly influence soldiers and their parents and friends to violate censorship regulations. A press association recently carried a story telling how a civilian well versed in animal lore was trying to help parents determine where their sons were located.

Unfortunately the enemy also has personnel well versed in animal lore. Therefore, such attempts to reveal locations amount, in reality, to using a code which is easily understood by our enemies.

The use of codes of any type is strictly against security regulations, and violators are subject to penalties ranging from a reprimand to a court-martial.

These cases, particularly the former, demonstrate two urgent needs: first, the need for greater and continued security education for troops, and, second, the need for keeping secret military information—especially that involving future operations—out of discussions in the presence of persons whose duties do not require such knowledge.

On the other hand, the men who commit breaches of security out of sheer ignorance of what the censor can and cannot pass would benefit from a practice recently instituted by an Australian unit. This unit has established what it calls a "Censor's Diary." Censored portions of letters are posted on a notice board, with brief comments by the censor officer explaining why these portions are not suitable for transmission. The enlisted men have praised the innovation as being a great help, and the censors have found that it has lightened their work to a remarkable degree.

A South African major general, recommending this scheme for consideration by the units of his command, sensibly points out that several precautions must be observed: "Personal and family matters should not be published. Typed copies of extracts should be posted, so that the writers' identities are not revealed. Examples which will benefit the largest number should be selected, and comments should be brief, pithy, and constructive."

---

**DISTRIBUTION: C and H (2)**

(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)

